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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

CLYDE A. JACOBSON and
REGINA J. JACOBSON,
PlaintiffsAppellants ,

Case No. 39,647

-vsCLYDE E. JACOBSON and
ERMA B. JACOBSON,
DefendantsRespondents.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

NATURE OF THE CASE
This action was initiated in 1974

for the

purpose of canceling a void deed constituting a cloud on
title to real property.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The dispute was tried before the Honorable George
E. Ballif, in the Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah
County, sitting without a jury.

The court made findings

of fact and conclusions of law and entered judgment for
Respondents, the defendants below.

The court found that

the deed to the disputed property vested full legal title

in the Respondents, free and clear of any and all claims
in favor of the Appellants.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants seek to have the judgment of the trial
court overruled.

Appellants ask this Court to declare that

full legal title to the disputed property is vested in
them and to enter judgment in their favor.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On August 28, 1962, Appellants Clyde E. Jacobson and Regina Jacobson purchased the property in dispute,
approximately twelve acres of land located in Utah County.
Sellers were Norval and Alice Carter, and the sale was
made under a Uniform Real Estate Contractf (Tr. 11,
Exhibit P-3) at a purchase price of $14,538.10. Appellants made an initial downpayment of $809.91.

(Tr. 11).

After repairing the house on that property to make it
habitable, Jacobson and his family occupied the premises.
Appellants made monthly payments of $100.00
under the terms of the contract until early 1965 at which
time their payments for the property became delinquent
(Tr. 99). The seller instituted foreclosure proceedings
in May of 1965.

Pursuant to an order issued by the court

Appellants were allowed until June 8, 1965 to pay off the
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balance of their indebtedness to the sellers or a
judgment of foreclosure would issue.

(Tr. 16).

In order to obtain enough money to pay the
balance owing, Jacobson approached one Earl Stubbs of
Provo, Utah.

Stubbs agreed to lend him the sum of

$10,000.00 but was unable to advance the entire amount
due, $14,538.10

(Tr. 18). The remainder was raised by

the Appelantfs father, Respondent Clyde E. Jacobson,
(hereinafter referred to as Jacobson senior).
On June 8, 1965, the last day that payment
could be made, Stubbs and both Jacobsons met in the
office of the seller's attorney, Heber Grant Ivans.
They made an agreement whereby Stubbs advanced $10,000.00
for payment of the obligation to the seller and Jacobson senior advanced $4,538.10.

(Tr. 101, Exhibit P-5).

Stubbs was concerned about securing his loan
to Jacobson.

The parties did not wish to have title to

the property remain in Jacobsonfs name, however, since
it would become subject to a prior judgment.

It was

agreed that the loan could not be secured by mortgaging
the property

(Tr. 104).

As an alternative to a formal mortgage, the
Appellant executed an "Open Warranty Deed" to Stubbs
as security for his loan.

A warranty deed signed by

Jacobson with the names of grantees and grantors left
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blank was sent to Stubbs by Ivans who handled the transaction

(Tr. 105, Exhibit P-8). The blank deed given

to Stubbs was intended and understood by the parties
to create a security interest and not to accomplish a
conveyance of the property.
It is questionable whether Regina Jacobson
signed the deed at the time it was delivered to Stubbs.
She admits signing it eventually, but maintains that she
did so unknowingly.

(Tr. 81). The property description

was very likely absent from the deed at this time also.
(Tr. 22, 107). Jacobson never saw the deed again unless
when signed by his wife.
The warranty deed that was sent to Stubbs is
the deed under which Respondents claim legal title to.
the disputed property.
Approximately a year after he signed the "open
deed" the Appellant learned that his father had paid off
the balance of his debt to Stubbs.

(Tr. 38). The blank

deed as well as the warranty deed to Jacobson from the
seller were recorded on July 18, 1966.

Respondents

names were filled in as grantees in the blank deed.
(Exhibits P-8, P-6) . The original of the record was to
be sent to Jacobson senior.

Neither Appellants knew

who recorded the deed nor did they authorize the recording.

(Tr. 38, 84).
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Appellants continued to occupy the disputed
property throughout these events, leaving and returning
at will.

Jacobson left twice due to marital problems

and Regina left once when a divorce was contemplated.
Jacobson's sister and her husband lived there during
that brief period

(Tr. 50).

At no time after its purchase did Appellants
transfer the property to anyone or intend a conveyance
by any transaction.
POINT I.
WHERE THE PROCEEDING TO BE REVIEWED
IS IN EQUITY IT IS THE DUTY AND
PREROGATIVE OF THE SUPREME COURT
TO REVIEW BOTH LAW AND FACTS AND
TO CONSIDER THE WEIGHT OF THE
EVIDENCE
Since the present action is in equity, this
Court has the authority and the responsibility to review
the trial courtfs findings of fact as well as its conclusions of law.

In' Richins

v. Struhs, 17 Utah 2d.

356, 412 P.2d 314, 315 (1966), an action to enforce
an easement by proscription it was noted that:
" * * * this attempt to assert and
establish an interest in land, the
legal title to which is vested in
another is a proceeding in equity.
It is the duty and prerogative of
this court to review both the law
and the facts, and to consider the
weight and sufficiency of the evidence."
-5-

The standard of review of an action in equity
is more advantageous to an appellant than in other
cases.

The Supreme Court is entitled to make its own

findings and substitute its judgment for that of the
trial court.

Mitchell v. Mitchell, 527 P.2d 1359

(Utah 1974).
In Pogano v. Walker, 539 P.2d 452, 454 (Utah
1975), an action to impose a trust on a joint bank
account, this Court pointed out that even in equity
cases a trial court's findings are viewed " with considerable indulgence".

But they will be overruled if

the evidence "clearly preponderates against them".
In this action Appellants contest the trial
courtfs findings of fact as well as conclusions of
law based upon them.

If the weight of the evidence is

against the trial court's judgment they are entitled
to have it overruled.

POINT II.
APPELLANTS ESTABLISHED WITH CLEAR AND
CONVINCING PROOF THAT THE DEED THEY SIGNED
DID NOT ACT AS A PROPERTY CONVEYANCE
A.

INCONTROVERTED EVIDENCE PROVED THAT THE
APPELLANTS DID NOT INTEND THE DEED TO
BE A CONVEYANCE AND THAT THE GRANTEES
WERE LEFT BLANK WHEN DELIVERED.
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It was the undisputed testimony of both
Appellants and the attorney who arranged the transaction that the deed by which Respondents assert
ownership was intended to operate as a security
interest only and not a property conveyance.
It is undisputed that the Appellants purchased the property in question in 1962 and that the
only deed which Jacobson signed subsequent to his
purchase was executed in Grant Ivans1 office on June
8, 1965.

It was Jacobsonfs testimony that the deed

he signed contained no property description and that
spaces for the names of grantors and grantees were
left blank.

The deed was sent to Earl Stubbs as

security for a loan of $10,000.00 according to Jacobson's testimony, and was not intended as a conveyance
of his property.
"Q.

(By Mr. Randle) Did you intend to
sell your property to Mr. Stubbs?

A.

No.

Q.

Were you to pay him back?

A.

Yes."

(Tr. 27-28).

Regina Jacobson1s signature also appears on
the deed under which Respondents claim their interest in
the property.

It was her testimony that, although her
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signature appears on the document, she signed it without knowing what it was, and never intended to convey
her interest.
11

Q.

When you signed that document, did
you know it was a warranty deed?

A.

No, I did not.

Q.

Have you ever entered into a transaction where you intended to transfer
that property to anyone?

A.

Never."

(Tr. 82) .

In addition to the Appellants themselves, Heber
Grant Ivans, the attorney who arranged the transaction
appeared on their behalf.

Ivans testified that the loan

made by Stubbs to Jacobson was not secured by a formal
mortgage because an

outstanding judgment made it un-

wise to leave title in Jacobson himself.

(Tr. 107).

It was Ivans who mailed the warranty deed to Stubbs
which left the grantors and grantees blank.

(Tr. 10 7).

It was his understanding and his testimony that the
deed was a security and was not intended as a property
conveyance.
11

Q.

Now, was the form of the transaction you structured, the form
of a loan, and is that what the
intention was to be, or was it
a conveyance? I mean, is the
basic structure other than the
documents themselves, which of
-8-

course purport to be a conveyance, was it meant to be a
conveyance? Or was it meant to
be a loan and a security agreement?
A.

Well, all I would say is that it
was my recollection that Mr. Stubbs
had loaned this money to assist
Clyde A. Jacobson and his wife because he felt sorry for the boy
and his wife. (Tr. Ill).
* * *

A.

* * * In my opinion, the deeding
transaction, as far as Mr. Stubbs
was concerned, was for security
purposes." (Tr. 113).

During his testimony Ivans identified letters
sent from him to the sellers and to Stubbsalong with
copies of the deed.

In the letter to Mr. and Mrs.

Carter, the sellers, he states:
"I am enclosing a Warranty Deed with the
Grantee left blank . . . "
(Exhibit P-19)
In his letter to Stubbs, Ivans notes that:
" I am also enclosing a Warranty Deed
signed by the Jacobsons made in
blank. . ." (Exhibit P-2 0).
The Respondent introduced no evidence whatsoever which contradicted Appellant's proof that the
warranty deed was not intended as a property conveyance
and did not name the grantors and grantees when delivered.
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Jacobson did admit on direct examination that
in 1969 he filed bankruptcy in Federal Court where
he testified that he had no ownership interest in the
disputed property.

(Tr. 46). He admitted that his

testimony in that action contradicted his assertions
in the present action and said that he had given false
testimony in order to protect his land,

(Tr. 62).

Respondents offered the "Discharge of Bankrupt" in
evidence.

(Exhibit D-9) .

Regina Jacobson acknowledged on direct examination that she had filed for divorce against her
husband in 1973 and that the land in question is not
listed among her holdings in pleadings filed.

She

testified, however, that the omission was an oversight
of her counsel and that she had consistently requested
to him that she did have such an interest.

Her

attorney appeared and testified that she had asserted
her interest in the property to him.

(Tr. 122).

The file in Mrs. Jacobsonfs divorce action wais introduced by the Respondents.

(Exhibit D-12).

Although this evidence might suggest that on
a particular occasion both Appellants disclaimed
ownership in the disputed property, when viewed in
relation to their circumstances no such inference is
justified by those statements.
-10-

More importantly, these facts do not affect
or alter in anyway the Appellants uncontroverted proof
that the deed which they signed was not intended by
them as a property conveyance and was not filled in
when delivered.

Nor did Respondents1 introduction

of evidence that the deed was eventually recorded in
the Respondents1 names and that title insurance was
issued to them address the crucial issues of fact.
B.

AS A MATTER OF LAW A DEED WHICH WAS
NOT INTENDED AS A PROPERTY CONVEYANCE
AND DID NOT CONTAIN THE NAMES OF THE
GRANTEE IS NOT A CONVEYANCE.
From time immemorial, the common law has been

that a transfer of property cannot take place unless
the grantors intend it.

As this Court stated in

Givan v. Lambeth, 10 Utah 2d. 287, 351 P.2d 959, 961
(1960), no conveyance takes place until there is "an
actual delivery with intent to transfer ownership."
Often an instrument which purports to be a
conveyance is intended to be the delivery of a
security interest and not a property transfer.

Where

that is the case, the parties are allowed to prove
their real intention and the courts will construe
the instrument accordingly.
In Bybee v. Stewart, 112 Utah 462, 189 P.2d
118 (1948), the parties to a warranty deed executed a
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contemporaneous agreement which established that the
deed was intended as security only.

The Supreme Court

held that where a written agreement shows an intention
to create a security interest and not a conveyance
the transaction will be treated as a mortgage.
However, proof of the parties1 intention
in drafting a warranty deed need not be in writing.
In Kesler v. Rogers, 542 P.2d 354 (Utah 1975), an
action brought by a purchaser of property to contest
ownership of a particular tract, this Court reaffirmed its consistent holding to that effect.

Re-

ferring to the Parole Evidence Rule it was noted
that:
"In more specific application here,
when the conveyance (or part of it)
was made only for the purpose of
security rather than as an outright
conveyance, that fact may be shown.,,f
The instrument mailed to Stubbs had no legal
effect as a conveyance, not only because the parties
never intended that the property be sold but because
the names of the grantees were omitted from it.

In

Burnham v. Eschler, 116 Utah 61, 208 P.2d 96, 97 (1949)
a quiet title action, the Court explained that:
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"A paper purporting to be a
deed, but which is blank as to the
grantee is no deed and is ineffective as a conveyance while the blank
remains.
. . . Also, if the name of the grantee
is inserted by a party who never legally
obtained possession of the instrument
nor obtained authority from the grantor
to complete the instrument, no deed
comes into existence,"
The grantors did not intend the deed by which
Respondents claim their interest to be a conveyance.
When mailed, the space for the names of the grantees
was left blank.

The grantors at no time authorized

the completion of the deed with Respondents names
inserted as grantees.

As a matter of law, that

instrument could not transfer the disputed property
from Appellants to Stubbs.
Since Stubbs received only a security interest he could not convey a property interest to
the Respondents.

Regardless of the belief under which

Jacobson senior may have acted in paying the balance
which Appellant owed Stubbs he received no interest
in the disputed property because the only deed ever
signed by its owner as a matter of law was not a conveyance .
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POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING
THAT BECAUSE NO EVIDENCE OF THE
FORMAL REQUISITES OF A MORTGAGE
WAS INTRODUCED THE DEED MUST BE
TREATED AS A CONVEYANCE
The trial court held that inasmuch as no
evidence of interest rate, terms of repayment and
other requirements of an enforceable mortgage was
introduced, the deed could not be treated as a
mortgage.

The trial court misconstrued the law

which looks to the intention of the parties and not
the requisites of a formal mortgage to determine how
a warranty deed should be construed.
In Bybee, supra 189 P.2d at 122, the Court
pointed out that, to be treated as a mortgage:
"No particular form is necessary so
long as the intention of the parties
is shown * * * * *
a deed absolute
on its face may be shown by parole
evidence to have been given for
security purposes only and when
such a showing has been made, equity
will give effect to the intention of
the parties. Such security transactions, lacking the requisites of
a formal mortgage are termed equitable mortgages."
It has never been suggested by this Court that
the rate of interest and terms of repayment must be
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established in order to treat a warranty deed as a
mortgage.

In the recent Kesler case, supra, for

example, such evidence was lacking.

The Court treated

the deed as a mortgage simply because parole evidence
established that it was intended as a security agreement.

No other showing has ever been required.
It should be noted that in this instance

Appellants offered proof of the terms of the security
arrangement with Stubbs through the testimony of
Jacobson himself.

That evidence was excluded by the

trial court as hearsay, over counsel's objection that
the terms of a contract are verbal acts and not hearsay.

(Tr. 26). Stubbs was unable to testify himself

due to illness. Appellants specifically claim this
exclusion of evidence as error by the trial court.
CONCLUSION
The only deed to the disputed property signed
by its owners, Appellants Clyde E. and Regina Jacobson, was a blank deed intended as security for a loan.
As a matter of law, this deed did not act as a conveyance of their property to Earl Stubbs.

Stubbs in turn

was incapable of conveying their property to Respondents
who claim title under that deed.

Appellants never

conveyed their interest in the disputed property to
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Respondents or to anyone else.

For these reasons,

Appellants ask this Court to declare that full legal
title to the disputed property is vested in them.
Respectfully submitted,

[CHT
RANDLE
807 East South Temple
Suite #202
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103
Attorneys for Appellants
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